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ABSTRACT
The paper derives world income or expenditure distribution of individuals for two
years 1988 and 1993. It is the first paper to calculate world distribution for
individuals based entirely on household survey data from 91 countries, and
adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity between the countries.
Measured by the Gini index, inequality increased from an already very high 63 in
1988 to 66 in 1993. The increase was driven more by rising differences in mean
incomes between the countries than by rising inequalities within countries. The
most important contributors were rising urban-rural differences in China, and
slow growth of rural  incomes in South Asia compared to several large developed
market economies.
JEL Classification: D31, personal income and wealth distribution; I3 welfare and poverty; 057
comparative studies of countries.
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I. The objective   
The issues of income inequality have gained increased prominence in the last decade.
There are several reasons for this. Some are empirical: increasing inequality in Western countries
in 1980’s, then an “explosion” of inequality in transition economies in the 1990’s. Others are
“theoretical”: economic theory is able to incorporate the issues of inequality better today than a
few decades ago. There is greater interest in the growth-equality relationship (Lundberg and
Squire 1999); inequality plays a central role in the endogeneous growth models; there are several
new approaches to what determines inequality (Li, Squire and Zou 1998; Benabou 2000);
inequality and political economy are linked through the median voter hypothesis. Finally, not the
least important reason, is a vastly increased availability of  income distribution data. Without
exaggeration, one could say that the increase in the coverage of the world by income or
expenditure surveys plays the same role in heightening the importance of income inequality
today, that the work on national income aggregates played in the early 1930’s in paving the way
for a more thorough study of macroeconomics. 
2
Recently, the fact of rising inequality within many countries was linked with the issues of
globalization. Several writers (Richardson 1995, Wood 1995) have asked if rising inequality may
be related to globalization, and others (Williamson 1999) have pointed to similar spurs in
inequality at the turn of the last century—which also was a period of globalization. But
globalization also implies that national borders are becoming less important, and that every
individual may, in theory, be regarded simply as a denizen of the world. Then, the question may
be asked: is  world inequality increasing? For, even if within-country inequalities are rising,
world income inequality need not increase, or may even decline, if the poor (and populous)
countries grow faster than the rich (and less populous) countries. In other words, even if
globalization can be shown to lead to an increase in within-country inequalities, globalization
may lessen  income differences between individuals in the world.
The objective of the paper is to answer this question empirically—or more exactly, since
we lack the data for any prolonged (in time) study of world income inequality, to at least
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establish the benchmark for world inequality in two years, 1988 and 1993. We shall derive the
first personal world income distribution based directly and solely on household survey data, and
adjusted for differences in purchasing powers of individuals in different countries. The two
years, 1988 and 1993, are chosen because these are the years for which the direct international
price comparison data are available. Of course, such a study is made possible only thanks to a
massively expanded data base on income distribution. Over the last decade, many countries in
Africa conducted their first national representative household income or expenditure surveys.
The economic changes in China in the late 1970’s, and the end of the Cold War in the late
1980’s, opened up to the researchers the hitherto unavailable sources in China and the former
Soviet Union. Thus, for the first time in human history, researchers have reasonably accurate
data on distribution of income or welfare (=expenditures or consumption) amongst more than 90
percent of world population.
Now, other than for the reasons of intellectual curiosity, why should one be concerned
with world inequality? There are, I think, several reasons that could be adduced. The awareness
of a problem often begins, or is at least enhanced, by its conceptualization and quantification. We
need to measure world inequality in order to be able to say whether it is, in our view, large or
not; whether current policies are contributing to it, or not; and finally, whether we need to do
something about it—if we deem it too large. It may be, not unreasonably, conjunectured that
with globalization and greater awareness of other peoples’ cultures and their level of living, the
concern with poverty and inequality at the world level might begin to resemble the concern with
the same issues at the national level. That is not a fanciful prognostication: one needs to
remember that the empirical interest in inequality and poverty at the level of the nation-state is
also relatively recent. Although the states were in existence for a very long time, the first
calculations of inequality were made at the turn of the 19
th century; since then inequality within
nations has become a much more researched, and hotly debated topic. In addition,  knowing
where individuals from different countries stand in the world income distribution helps us
address such current issues as what is the probability that the Tobin or some similar tax levied at
the citizens of the rich countries would end up in the pockets of wealthy individuals from the
poor countries. Is this statistically likely? If proceeds from the tax were distributed randomly
across citizens of poor countries, or even in proportion to one’s income, we can readily calculate
the probabability that the tax would result in a regressive transfer at the world level.4
Section II will review the previous studies and explain how this one differs from them. In
Section III, I explain in detail the procedure of calculation, and look at the coverage. Sections IV
and V present the findings, dealing respectively with regional income inequalities, and world
income inequality. Section VI looks at factors that lie behind the calculated level of world
inequality, and the 1988-93 change. Section VII compares our results with those from other
studies. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. Previous work
Most previous studies were studies of  international  inequality in the sense that they
calculated what would be inequality in the world if the world were populated by representative
individuals from all countries, that is by people having mean income of their countries. The most
notable examples are several studies by Henry Theil (Theil, 1979; Theil and Seale, 1994; Theil
1996; but see also Podder, 1993) who decomposed international inequality into regional
components in order to show, among other things, decomposability properties of  the Theil index
of inequality. For income, these studies used GDP per capita, not survey data.
The second group of studies is better in the sense that they acknowledge the fact that the
world is not populated by representative individuals from each country, and try somehow to take
into account income distributions within countries. However, since they do not have access to the
survey data, which alone provide information on distribution,  such studies use countries’ Gini
coefficients or other indicators of inequality in order to estimate the entire distribution from a
single statistic. A good example of this type of work is a recent paper by T. Paul Schultz (1998).
His analysis is based on a between-country component which reflects differences in Purchasing
power parity ($PPP) GDPs per capita, and a within-country component where an inequality
measure (log variance) for each individual country was obtained from a regression analysis using
the Deininger-Squire (1996) data base. A very similar approach was adopted by Chotikapanich,
Valenzuela and Rao (1997). They use the GDP per capita (in PPP terms) and the Gini coefficient
for each country (also obtained from the Deininger and Squire data base), and assume that
income distributions of all countries follow a log-normal pattern. They thus obtain estimates of
within-country income distributions needed to derive world inequality. The approach followed
by these studies is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, distributions cannot be well predicted5
from a single inequality statistic, nor is it acceptable to assume that all distributions follow the
same pattern. Indeed, this is a pis-aller, explicitly acknowledged  by Chotikapanich, Valenzuela
and Rao when they observe that “information on the income distributions, or, at least, the
population and income shares for a number of income classes [by countries]…is not available”
(1997, p. 535). Second, GDP is an imperfect indicator of household disposable income or
expenditures, both because it often fails to account for home-consumption which is particularly
important in poor countries, and includes (e.g.) undistributed profits or increase in stocks which
do not directly affect current welfare of the population. Moreover, as we shall see below, there is
a systematic relationship between the ratio of income or expenditures obtained from household
surveys (HS) to GDP, and level of GDP per capita.
More accurate studies use survey data. For example, Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson
(1983) and Grosh and Nafziger (1986) combine survey-derived income or expenditure shares
with countries’ per capita GDPs (in PPP-adjusted terms). Both papers derive world (not
international) income distribution using income shares from household budget surveys for
“developed countries and about forty less developed countries” (Berry, Bourguignon and
Morrisson, p.219) and seventy one countries (Grosh and Nafziger, 1986, p. 349). Income shares
are multiplied by countries’ GDPs per capita in order to get mean income per each quantile.
3 In
other words, household surveys are used to get income shares, but the actual incomes for
different income classes are  not obtained directly from the surveys. The difference may be
important because, as mentioned before, the ratio of mean per capita survey income or
expenditure to per capita GDP is not constant across countries.  In addition, for countries for
which they did not have income distribution data, Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1983)
estimate income shares “on the basis of observed relationships between the shares of seven
quantiles in countries for which comparable…data do exist and a set of explanatory variables”
(p.219). For these countries they use a regression analysis to determine income/expenditure
shares.
4 Recently, Korzeniewick and Moran (1997), use the same approach although they
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(decile) shares with which they multiply countries’ GDP per capita, are derived from distributions of household
income across households. Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1983) use –correctly—distribution of per capita
household income across individuals.
4 Grosh and Nafziger (1986) similarly “allocate” some 40 countries into several groups (low income, middle
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multiply income shares (quintiles for 46 countries) by dollar per capita GDPs (not per capita
GDPs in PPP terms). Not surprisingly, they find that between-country differences –which are
magnified when simple dollar per capita GDPs are used—explain most of world inequality. Thus
they feel justified in expanding their sample from 46 countries for which they have income-share
data, to 112 countries using simple GDPs per capita and ignoring within-country distributions. In
effect, they revert to a study of inter-national inequality. Firebaugh (1999), in response to
Korzeniewick and Moran (1997), also presents a study of international inequality but he uses per
capita GDPs in PPP terms.
Since Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson published their article, some fifteen years ago,
there has been a huge increase in the availability of surveys in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, and Africa in particular. There are many more surveys  from other countries as well, and
data standardization (insuring  that variables are defined the same way as much as possible) has
progressed tremendously, thanks mostly to the efforts of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), and
the World Bank (Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), Africa Poverty Monitoring,
Household Expenditure and Income Data for Transition Economies, HEIDE).
More recently, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999), have returned to the topic of world
inequality in a historical perspective. They study the evolution of world inequality between 1820
and 1990. Similarly to Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1983), they use quantile shares
multiplied by GDPs per capita (in PPP terms) to derive world income distribution. Since,
obviously, the data for such a long period of 170 years are sparsely available, they divide the
world in 33 country groups whose income distributions are approximated by one or more
countries belonging to the group. For example, distribution of 37 Latin American countries is
assumed to be the same as that of Brazil; distribution of Indonesia the same as that of India until,
of course, the data for Indonesia become available in the late 1960’s etc.
Finally, we come to the papers that are methodologically almost identical to this one.
These are papers by Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle (1991), Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1994),
and Ravallion and Chen (1997). The last study, for example, is based entirely on household
                                                                                                                                                                                  
computed from the countries whose income distributions are available. For several centrally-planned countries they
use wage distributions.7
survey data from 67 countries with 42 countries being represented with at least two surveys.
These studies have produced the widely quoted World Bank estimates of the people living in
absolute poverty (at less than $PPP1 per capita per day), and their results were repeatedly used in
World Bank’s  World Development Reports and  World Development Indicators. The major
difference between their and this work is in the coverage (they do not include advanced market
economies)
5 and focus (they are interested in changes in world poverty; not in world inequality).
This is therefore the first study which is based solely on household survey data and where
world income distribution is derived the same way as we would derive a country’s income
distribution from regional distributions.
III. Methodology, sources, and coverage
Methodology: quality of data and how are the calculations done. For each country for
which nationally representative survey data  are available, we take local currency (LC) mean
income or expenditure per decile (if we have access to unit record data), or for any other
population shares (e.g. 12 or 15 population groups). 
6 The objective is that the number of such
data points be at least ten in order to have a sufficiently precise description of a distribution. In
total, for both years, there are 216 country surveys with an average of  10.8 data points in 1988
and 11.4 data points in 1993. Most countries’ data are deciles; some countries however have 16,
18, 20 or more data points. There are only 12 surveys where we have only quintiles (5 data
points).  Each data point is weighted by the population it represents. For example, one decile in
the US survey represents 1/10th of the US population, one decile in the Nigerian survey
represents 1/10th of Nigeria's population etc.
The quality of the surveys is uneven. It could hardly have been otherwise because the
surveys have all been conducted independently by countries’ statistical offices, even if their
objectives (to assess the average standard of living or income of the population and its
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distribution) and national representativeness are the same.  In principle, we can distinguish two
types of  problems.
First, the issue of survey quality. Although the claim of national representativeness is
shared by all surveys, they may not all achieve it. Moreover, even the definition of what
“national representativeness” means may vary. It varies even among the developed countries
where the survey techniques are generally thought to be better. For example, Israeli surveys do
not include the self-employed and rural population. Urban areas are defined as those with more
than 2,000 inhabitants for Jewish localities, and more than 10,000 for non-Jewish localities
(Achdut, p. 152). Japan’s  Family Income and Expenditure Survey seriously underrepresent
farmers and one-person households (Tachibanaki and Yagi, p. 112). These problems are
magnified when we use surveys from more than 100 countries, where such sources of bias often
go unreported. However, no adjustments to the surveys were made first, because information on
sources of the bias survey-by-survey is unavailable, and second, even if we had  information
regarding omission of certain population categories, it is simply beyond the scope of knowledge
of any single researcher  to make meaningful corrections for such a great and varied number of
surveys.
The second source of potential problems has to deal with differences in the surveys’
definition of income and expenditures—the two welfare categories we use to rank people. Here,
fortunately, we can take a less agnostic attitude. For example, the source of our data  for most
OECD countries is Luxembourg Income Study which, using the member country surveys,
attempts to standardize the variable definitions (e.g. making sure that disposable income is
defined the same way across all countries). For several transition economies and Latin American
countries, I have used respectively the HEIDE database and a database created by the Inter-
American Development Bank (described in Szekely and Hilgert, 1999) where variable
definitions are also standardized. (More detail about data sources is provided in Annex I.) For the
countries—about ¾ of their total number—where  the quantiles were calculated from the
individual level data,  I have tried to define the variables in a consistent fashion: for example to
have income include not only monetary income but home-consumption as well. In the remaining
cases—even if unfortunately this group includes the single most important country for world9
income distribution, namely China—where  I had access only to the  pre-defined or grouped (not
individual level) data I had to go by whatever  the definition of income or expenditures was.
The unit of analysis is throughout the individual, which means that each decile includes
10 percent of individuals in a given country. Individuals are ranked by their household per capita
income or expenditures (see Table 1).
7 When only published data were available, and if, for
example, the distribution was that of households, so that each decile contained 10 percent of
households, such data were not used. The tabulated distributions were used only if they gave
percentage of  individuals ranked by their household per capita income.
Table 1. Summary of world income distribution characteristics
Unit of observation Individual
Welfare concept Disposable per capita income or
expenditures per capita
Ranking criterion Welfare concept per capita
Currency units $PPP or $
Coverage. Table 2 divides all the countries and territories
8 in the world into four groups:
those included in our data base for both years (called “common sample”), those included in
1988, but not in 1993; those included in 1993 but not in 1988; and those not included in either
year. The common sample consists of  91 countries, inclusive of the data for large countries
(China, India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia) that have been divided into rural and urban parts. For
1988, other than the common sample, I had the data for 10 additional countries, and for 1993, for
28 additional countries. Thus the full 1993 sample was 119 countries.
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level data for all countries. Unfortunately for about a fourth of the countries in the sample I had to rely on pre-
calculated per capita tabulations.
8 For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, both will be called “countries.” This includes not only territories such as
Puerto Rico, but also “units” whose legal positions changed between 1988 and 1993: the republics of the former
USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia that have become independent countries, or Hong Kong that has rejoined
China.10
The largest difference between 1988 and 1993 is a much better coverage of African
countries. While in 1988, I had data for only 14 African countries, their number increased to 29
in 1993. This is mostly thanks to a number of surveys in Africa conducted or organized by the
World Bank, or whose results were compiled and made more easily accessible to researchers by
the Africa Region of the World Bank. Note the significant increase in the full-sample coverage
of Africa shown in Table 4: the share of African population included went up from slightly under
½ to almost ¾. The share of GDP covered reached almost 90 percent.
Sixty-one countries are not included in either year. However, our coverage, both in terms
of income or population is much greater than this number suggests, because most of the non-
included countries are very small, measured either by their GDPs or population. For example, the
total population of 22 non-included Latin American and Caribbean countries (see Table 2)  is 42
million, and their combined  GDP in 1993 was $80 billion. This is about equal to the population
and GDP of Poland.
All the countries are divided into five geographical regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Western Europe,
North America and Oceania (WENAO). The last region is the “old OECD” region short of
Japan, that is it includes the “old” OECD countries before the recent expansion of the
organization in Eastern Europe, Mexico, and South Korea. The distribution of countries by
region is shown in Table 2.
The countries included in 1988 and 1993 represent respectively about 4.4 and 5 billion
people, or respectively 86 and 91 percent of world population. The common-sample countries
cover about 84 percent of world population (Tables 3 and 4). The total current dollar GDP of the
countries covered is about 95 percent of world GDP in both years. The common-sample
countries account for about 93 percent of world GDP (Table 4).11
Table 2. Countries included in the study
Countries in BOTH 1988 and 1993 Countries included ONLY in 1993
Western Europe, North America and Oceania (22)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., USA
Latin America and Caribbean (17)
Argentina(urban), Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador(urban), Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Venezuela,
Ecuador 1/,  Uruguay 2/,  Peru 3/
Eastern Europe and FSU (22)
Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Georgia, Slovak Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, FR Yugoslavia,
Slovenia
Asia (17)
Bangladesh(rural), Bangladesh(urban), China(rural), China(urban), Hong Kong,
India(rural), India(urban), Indonesia(rural), Indonesia(urban), Japan, Jordan, Korea
South, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand
Africa (13)
Algeria, Egypt(urban), Egypt(rural), Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia
Total: 91
Western Europe, North America and Oceania (1)
Turkey
Latin America and Caribbean(2)
Guyana, Nicaragua
Eastern Europe and FSU (1)
Albania
Asia(8)
Laos, Mongolia(urban), Mongolia(rural), Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Singapore,
Vietnam, Yemen Rep.
Africa(16)
Bissau, Burkina, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania,
Namibia, Niger (rural), Niger (urban), RCA, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania
Total: 28
Countries included ONLY in 1988 Countries NOT included in either year
Western Europe, North America and Oceania (1)
Spain
Latin America and Caribbean(2)
Guatemala, Trinidad & Tobago
Eastern Europe and FSU (5)






Western Europe, North America, and Oceania (1)
Iceland
Latin America and Caribbean(21)
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina(rural), Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda,
Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador(rural), French Guyana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti,
Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Gr.,
Suriname, Virgin Islands
Asia(18)
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Korea North, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Macao, Maldives, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab
Emirates
Africa (21)
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde Is, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Togo, Zaire, Zimbabwe
Total: 61
1/ In 1988 only urban; in 1993 the whole country. 2/ In 1988 the whole country; in 1993 only urban. 3/ In 1988 only Lima; in 1993 the whole country.12
Turning to the regions, WENAO and Eastern Europe/FSU are covered in the full sample
almost in full (92 to 99 percent of population; not less than 95 percent of GDP). Asia and LAC
are covered about 90 percent, both in terms of population and GDP. Finally, Africa’s coverage,
as already mentioned, has substantially increased between 1988 and 1993: from around ½ in both
population and GDP to almost 90 percent in terms of GDP and ¾ in terms of population. The
common-sample coverage is still low in Africa. It is the reflection of unavailability of household
surveys until the very recent period. On the other hand, a significant jump in African coverage
(for the full-sample) between 1988 and 1993 shows that in terms of household survey availability
Africa is approaching the other continents.
Table 3. World population (in million)






1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993
Africa 607 672 293 503 286 306
Asia 2959 3206 2682 2984 2665 2868
E. Europe/FSU 425 411 422 391 399 388
LAC 427 462 373 423 363 418
WENAO 707 755 653 716 614 656
World 5125 5506 4423 5017 4328 463513
Table 4. How much of the world do our data cover (in percent)?
Population Current dollar GDP
Full sample 1988 1993 1988 1993
Africa 48.3 74.8 52.0 89.2
Asia 90.6 93.1 91.0 91.3
E. Europe/FSU 99.3 95.2 99.4 96.3
LAC 87.4 91.6 90.2 92.5
WENAO 92.4 94.8 99.3 96.4
World 86.3 91.1 95.8 94.7
Common sample
Africa 47.2 45.5 51.4 49.9
Asia 90.1 89.5 90.8 89.8
E. Europe/FSU 93.8 94.2 95.0 96.1
LAC 85.1 90.5 88.8 92.3
WENAO 86.8 86.9 96.5 95.6
World 84.4 84.2 93.7 93.1
A special consideration is due to China and India. These two countries have respectively
1.2 and 0.9 billion people, that is almost 40 percent of world population. In order to improve the
analysis, their populations are shown separately for rural and urban areas (the same way that the
data are generated in their Surveys). Thus, the largest single “country” in the world is rural China
with 860 million people in 1993. The same breakdown into rural and urban populations was done
for three other  large countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan)
9 for which such survey data
were available.
Problems. Other than the issue of differential reliability (quality) of individual country
surveys, the main problem is the mixing of income and expenditures. Ideally, there could be two
different distributions, one based on incomes, another on expenditures. However, the number of
countries which would have been included in each would have been substantially lower than
when both income and expenditures are combined. Moreover since countries tend to conduct
either income or expenditures surveys, there would have been two unrelated distributions, none
of which would represent the “world.” One distribution would have been for that part of the
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world where most of the surveys are expenditure-based (Africa and Asia; see Table 5); another
for the part of the world where almost all surveys are income-based (WENAO, Eastern
Europe/FSU, and Latin America). 
10 Since expenditure surveys are more frequent in the poorer
part of the world (Africa and Asia), and since they tend to yield lower inequality and higher
mean than income-based surveys,
11 the mixing of income and expenditure data probably biases
Gini downward.
Table 5. Welfare indicators used in  surveys: income or expenditures
 (number of countries)
1988 1993
Income Expenditure Income Expenditure
Africa 3 11 2 27
Asia 9 9 8 16
Eastern Europe 27 0 19 3
LAC 18 1 16 3
WENAO 23 0 23 0
World 80 21 68 49
Note: The difference between 117 surveys for 1993 here, and 119 countries in 1993 as listed in Table 2
stems from the fact that East Germany, existing in 1988, was incorporated into the West Germany, and in 1988
Pakistan  was divided into rural and urban areas while that was not the case in 1993. In 1993, we thus have 117
surveys, but 119 “countries.”
Another problem is the use of a single PPP exchange rate for the whole country even if
we know that regional price differences may be large. This is particularly a problem in the case
of the four countries for which the survey data are broken down into rural and urban parts,
because presumably different PPP rates should apply to each part. For all of them but China, I
use the same PPP rates however. For China, in 1993, I use the rate reported in the  International
comparison project (ICP) for urban areas only (since the rate itself was obtained from surveys
conducted in two cities: Guandong and Shanghai), and reduce the price level in rural areas by an
estimated 20 percent (see Yao and Zhu, 1998, p. 138).
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average greater than expenditure-based Ginis by some 6.6 Gini points. Consequently, in their regressions, they
increase expenditure-based Ginis by 6.6 points, and that practice has recently been  adopted  by other researchers
(see Banerjee and Duffo, 2000).15
There are also possible inconsistencies and mistakes between the PPP rates calculated for
1988 and 1993. Small errors in the estimates of large countries’  PPPs may produce large effects
on the calculated world inequality. Table 6 shows the ratio between the domestic and world price
levels in 1988 and 1993 for China, India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The four countries’ price
levels ranged from 27 to 34 percent of the world level in 1988; in 1993, they ranged from 23 to
30 percent. In three countries out of four, the relative price level went down, which –bearing in
mind that these are poor countries—should reduce world inequality. We note, however, the
opposite trends in India’s and Indonesia’s relative price levels. While in 1988, the price levels in
India was the highest of the four countries, and some 20 percent higher than in Indonesia, in
1993, India’s price level is the lowest of the four, and almost ¼ less than Indonesia’s. This is a
fairly large swing.
Table 6. Ratio between domestic and international price level
in China, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh, 1988 and 1993
Purchasing power exchange
rate (LC per $)
Nominal exchange rate
(annual average)
Ratio of domestic to world
price level
1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993
India 4.756 a/ 6.997 a/ 13.917 30.493 0.342 0.229
China (urban) 1.038 a/ 1.414 a/ 3.72 5.762 0.279 0.245
Indonesia 453.453  b/ 626.130 a/ 1685.7 2087.1 0.269 0.300
Bangladesh 8.822  b/ 9.496 a/ 31.733 39.567 0.278 0.240
Sources: a/ Data from ICP tables provided by Yonas Biru (World Bank). b/ Data from Heston and
Summers (1991).
Finally, the fact that we assume that that all people within each quantile (data point) have
the same income/expenditures biases the overall inequality downward. We calculate the
“minimum” or lower-bound Gini (see Kakwani, 1980; pp. 97-100).  Although with only six or
seven optimally selected data points, the “minimum” Gini approximates the “true” Gini within a
few percentage points, this result is obtained within the context of income distribution for a
single country (Davies and Shorrocks, 1989, pp. 100-103). The problem is more complex in our
case because the span of world incomes, from the poorest income class to the richest, is much
wider than in any single country, some of the data points are very large, and they are not
optimally selected (that is, data points are not necessarily created at “best” places along income
distribution). Thus the minimum Gini might underestimate the true Gini by more than we would
normally expect. Yet the  use of minimum Gini was made necessary because in many important16
cases (e.g. China’s and India’s data points), we do not have information on income bounds of
each income class.  For example, the sixth income class of rural population in China has the
mean income of $PPP 615  and it contains 180 million people (the largest data point in the
study). Since the mean income of the income classes just below and above this one is
respectively $PPP 486 and $PPP 789, we know that all the 180 million people in our group must
have incomes between these two values, most likely  between $PPP 500 and $PPP 700. Yet this
is only one estimate of the bounds; it could as well be that the true bounds are $PPP 550 and
$PPP 720, or a variety of other values.  I therefore thought it more prudent to stay with a
conservative estimate of the minimum Gini—that is, of inequality where it is assumed that all
individuals within each data point have same income.17
IV. Regional income inequalities
Average regional  incomes. Table 7 shows mean regional GDP and income per capita. In
1993, the ratio between the richest (WENAO) and the poorest (Africa) region was 30 to 1 using
GDP per capita in current dollars, 11 to 1 using GDP per capita in international dollars (PPP),
and 8 to 1 using the data from household surveys adjusted for the differences in purchasing
power.
Table 7. GDP and income per capita
GDP per capita ($) GDP per capita ($PPP) Household survey
income/expenditure
per capita ($PPP)
1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993
Africa 619 673 1320 1757 1036 1233
Asia 1422 2007 1927 2972 1175 1752
E. Europe 1889 1194 6355 4522 3634 2646
LAC 1967 3027 4829 5923 2702 3483
WENAO 16255 20485 14713 19952 7581 9998
World 3649 4531 4442 5642 2475 3092
Note: All amounts are annual.  Full-sample countries.
We know since Kravis, Heston and Summers’ (1982) work and UN International
Comparison Project that adjusting for the differences in countries’ price levels reduces the gap
between poor and rich countries, because price level systematically increases with GDP per
capita. This reduces differences between rich and poor countries compared to what they would
have been if we used market exchange rates to convert GDPs. In addition, we find here that there
is—similar in its effect on the poor-to-rich nation gap—a systemematic relationship between (i)
the ratio of per capita income or expenditures from household surveys to GDP per capita
(RATIO), and  (ii) level of per capita GDP: as GDP per capita increases, the RATIO variable
decreases (see Figure 1). In other words, differences between rich and poor countries are less
when measured by incomes or expenditures per capita calculated from household surveys than
when measured by GDP per capita (some reasons why this may be so are given below).18
If we regress for 1988 and 1993, RATIO against (i)  GDP per capita (in $PPP terms), (ii)
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if HS data are expenditures-based and 0 if  income-based,
and (iii) the interaction term between GDP per capita and the expenditure dummy, all the
variables (but one in 1993) are significant at the 5 percent level (see Table 8). Every $PPP 1,000
increase in GDP per capita lowers RATIO by about 1 percentage point in 1993 and 2 percentage
points in 1988. The expenditure dummy is also significant implying that expenditure-based
surveys (more common in poor countries) yield RATIO values that are 30 to 40 percentage
points higher than income-based surveys. However, since the interaction term is negative and
significant, the RATIO variable declines faster as income goes up when household surveys are
expenditure-based. The difference between expenditure- and income-based surveys in their
RATIO values vanishes for GDP levels of about $PPP 1,800 per capita in 1988 and $PPP 3,300
in 1993.



























Note: The dependent variable is RATIO (income or expenditure per capita from household surveys divided
by GDP per capita). Significance levels between brackets.
What explains the decrease in RATIO as GDP per capita goes up? The cause seems to lie
in the systematic accounting divergence between GDP and household surveys. Four components,
imperfectly or not at all included in household survey data, tend to rise with GDP per capita.
They are (i) undisbursed corporate profits,  (ii) income from property,  (iii) personal taxes, and
(iv) government transfers in kind. Undisbursed corporate profits (and build-up of inventories) are
a component of GDP, but not of household income. Their share in GDP is, of course, higher in
richer countries, where the enterprise sector is larger and “formalized.” Income from capital
(property) is also greater in relative terms in richer countries, simply because income-rich19
countries are also capital-rich. Capital income is also the most underreported type of income in
household surveys, with underreporting estimated at up to 40 percent in some European OECD
countries.
12 Finally, disposable income as covered by surveys is defined as factor income (wages,
property income, self-employment income etc.) plus government cash transfers minus personal
income taxes. In richer countries, taxes withdrawn at source (and thus not included in household
surveys) as well as personal income taxes are a larger share of GDP than in poorer countries.
While one part of transfers financed by taxes (cash transfers) is included in HS’s, the other part –
often very sizeable—government education and health expenditures is not. Moreover, if there is
a current surplus in the financing of cash transfers (so that contributions and fees exceed the
outlays), disposable income in a country where such contributions are deducted at source will be
underestimated compared to a country where there is only private insurance. In the latter case, all
contributions and fees will be part of disposable income (see Lindbeck, 1990, pp.6-7). Most poor
countries belong to this category; most developed countries belong to the former (social security
contributions deducted at source).
These are the reasons why the difference between the rich and poor countries will be less
if we use their HS disposable income or expenditures than if we use their GDPs. It is reflected in
the fact that while in Africa household surveys account for over 70 percent of GDP, in WENAO
countries, the ratio is 50-51 percent. Asia, Eastern Europe/FSU, and Latin America and the
Caribbean are in between with the ratio of around 60 percent (Table 9). Therefore, one important
source of smaller world income inequality than that calculated using GDP per capita will lie in
the systematic difference –varying with income level—between the survey-collected incomes or
expenditures, and GDP.




E. Europe/FSU 57.2 58.5
LAC 55.9 58.8
W. Europe 51.5 50.1
World 54.5 53.4
Note:  weighted average.
                                                       
12 For example, Concialdi (1997, p. 261) writes that the best available French household surveys conducted by the
Institut National de Statistique et Etudes Economiques underestimate capital incomes by about 40 percent.20
Figure 1. RATIO as function of $PPP GDP per capita
   Year 1988                                                                               Year 1993
Note: Vertical axis: ratio (in percent) between average household survey income (or expenditure) and GDP.
Horizontal axis: GDP per capita in international dollars.
The fitted curve is based on a simple regression between $PPP GDP per capita and RATIO.
Regional Ginis.  Table 10 shows regional Gini coefficients for the common-sample
countries.  A regional Gini shows inequality in a given region (say, Asia) where each individual
is treated equally—simply as an inhabitant of a given region. In other words, the aggregation of
country distributions at the regional level proceeds in the same way as the aggregation of country
distributions to generate world income distribution. (This is important to underline to show that
the regional inequality is not simply inter-national inequality within the region.)
Note, first, that the most unequal regions are Asia and LAC with Ginis between 55 and
almost 62 (Table 10). They are followed by Africa where Gini has increased sharply from 43 in
1988 to 49 in 1993. Eastern Europe/FSU, and WENAO have traded places. In 1988, former
socialist bloc was the most equal region with a Gini of 26. However, the transition which has led
to massive increases of inequality within individual countries (Milanovic, 1998) has also led to
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higher than before the transition. It has surpassed the West European and North American region
whose inequality has remained at the Gini level of 37, about the same as the Gini coefficient for
the United States.
As Table 10 makes clear, between 1988 and 1993, inequality increased in three regions,
went down slightly in WENAO, and decreased by 1½ Gini points in Latin America and the
Caribbean. The most important increase occurred in Eastern Europe/FSU, while inequality in
both Asia and Africa went up by 6 Gini points.
Table 10. Regional Gini coefficients in 1988 and 1993





Latin America and Caribbean 57.1 55.6




Note: For the list of countries included in each region, see Table 2.
Comparison between Asia and Africa is instructive. While their mean and median
incomes are quite similar (e.g. in 1993, mean income in Asia was about $PPP 1,600, and in
Africa about $1,200; the medians were respectively $PPP680 and $PPP$750), the shape of the
income distribution curve is very different (Figure 2).  This is a reflection of much greater
heterogeneity in Asia (presence of rich countries) than in Africa. Consequently, the frequency of
the very poor people is much greater in Africa. Note that up to $PPP 300, the density function for
Africa lies significantly above the one for Asia. Africa’s modal income is extremely low
($PPP200), one-half of Asia’s modal income ($PPP400). Asian distribution extends much
further to the right. Five percent of Asian population have per capita incomes in excess of
$PPP7,600 per year while only ½ percent of African have such high incomes. This is, of course,
mostly because of people living in rich Asian countries: 83 percent of the Japanese have incomes
higher than $PPP7,600 per year, as do  60 percent of the South Koreans, 50 percent of the
Taiwanese and 50 percent of citizens of  Hong Kong.  By contrast, there are almost no such
people (in statistically significant numbers) in Africa.22
Figure 2. Income distribution (density functions) for Asia and Africa, 1993
 Note: x-axis in logs. The distribution function is smoothed using kernel function with a bandwidth 0.005.
Tables 11-15 show for each region the Pyatt (1976)-type decomposition where the overall
Gini is broken into three components: (a) within-country inequality, (b) between-country
inequality, and (c) an overlapping component.
13  The first component shows that  part of
inequality which is due to the differences in income between the recipients in individual
countries. The second component    accounts for inequality  due to people living in countries
with different mean incomes. In other words, even if within-country inequalities were zero, there
would still be differences between individual incomes due to the fact that mean incomes in each
country are different. Finally, the third (“overlapping”) component appears because the Gini
coefficient is not exactly decomposable by recipients. The overlapping component accounts for
the fact that somebody who lives in a richer country may still have an income lower than
                                                       
13 The same decomposition formula is derived also by  Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1984) and Shorrocks (1984). For


























somebody from a poorer country. One interpretation of the “overlapping” component is
“homogeneity” of  population (Yitzhaki and Lerman 1991, Yitzhaki 1994, Lambert and
Aronson, 1993). The more important the “overlapping” component compared to the other two,
the more homogeneous the population—or differently put, the less one’s income depends on
where she lives.  Thus, the third, residual component may be viewed as providing some
additional information compared to the measures, like Theil index, which are exactly
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where yi=mean income of country i,  Gi=Gini coefficient of country i; pi=income share of
country i in total income of the region (where countries are ranked by their mean incomes so that
yj>yi); pi=country’s  population share, and m=mean income of the region.
A glance at Tables 11-15 reveals that in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe/FSU, the
between-country component is the largest. In 1993, it was about 54 Gini points in Asia (87
percent of total inequality in Asia), 30 Gini points in Africa (almost two-thirds of total
inequality), and 26.4 Gini points in Eastern Europe/FSU (57 percent of total inequality).
14 In
LAC and WENAO, inequality in countries’ mean incomes is indeed important—it “explains”
about ¼ of total inequality—but overlapping is even more important. These two are
consequently the most homogeneous regions: note also that they have the lowest coefficient of
variation of population-weighted income/expenditure per capita. Asia, on the other hand, is by
far the most heterogeneous region.
As for the importance of within-country inequality,  it is largest in Latin America and the
Caribbean (11.7 Gini points), followed by Eastern Europe/FSU, and Western Europe and  North
                                                       
14 When we use for Africa the the entire sample of countries (29) rather than the common sample, the 1993 Gini
becomes 52.9, the between-country component 32.9, within-country 3.6, and the overlap component 16.4.24
America (respectively 9.5 and 8.3 Gini points). In both Africa and Asia, “within country”
inequality is of little importance. This is because the size of the within  component depends on
the product of the  population and income weights (see equation 1). Countries with large
population weights in Asia (India and China) have relatively low income weights. The issue is
discussed in greater detail in Section VI below. 
15
However, the relevance of regional inequality is limited—both because regional
“borders” are often arbitrary, and because study of regional inequality is not fundamentally
different from a study of country-level inequality. Our primary interest is world inequality. We
turn to this next.
                                                       
15 In addition, the most populous countries in Asia have relatively low inequality: rural China (30 percent of Asia’s
population) has the Gini of  32.9 in 1993; urban China (12 percent of population) has the Gini of 27; rural India (23
percent of population) has the Gini of  29; urban India (8 percent of the population) has the Gini of 35. Therefore,
countries accounting for 73 percent of Asia’s population, have Ginis between 27 and 35. In Africa, a similar role is
played by three countries: Egypt—11 percent of Africa’s population with the Gini of 38, Algeria (5 percent of
population) with the Gini of 35, and Morocco (5 percent of population) with the Gini of 36.25
Table 11. Africa: Gini decomposition, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993 Change
Within countries 6.2 6.2 0
Between countries 20.9 30.1 +9.2
Overlapping 15.6 12.4 -3.2
Total Gini 42.7 48.7 +6.0
Number of countries 13 13
Mean country Gini 41.8 41.4 -0.4
Coefficient of variation of Gini 25.2 19.6 -5.6
Average income/expenditures per capita ($PPP) 1078 1217 +12.9
Standard deviation income/expenditure
per capita ($PPP) 695 806
Coefficient of variation (%) 64 66 +2
Table 12. Asia: Gini decomposition, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993 Change
Within countries 3.2 3.0 -0.2
Between countries 46.3 53.6 +7.3
Overlapping 6.4 5.3 -1.1
Total Gini 55.9 61.8 +5.9
Number of countries 17 17
Mean country Gini 32.8 34.3 +1.5
Coefficient of variation of Gini 21.4 22.2 +0.8
Average income/expenditures per capita ($PPP) 1129 1613 +42.9
Standard deviation income/expenditures
per capita ($PPP) 2178 3587
Coefficient of variation (%) 193 222 +29
Table 13. Latin America and the Caribbean: Gini decomposition, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993 Change
Within countries 15.0 11.7 -3.3
Between countries 13.9 13.6 -0.3
Overlapping 28.2 30.3 +2.1
Total Gini 57.1 55.6 -1.5
Number of countries 17 17
Mean country Gini 48.1 49.1 +1.0
Coefficient of variation of Gini 13.4 12.9 -0.5
Average income/expenditures per capita ($PPP) 2814 3634 +29.1
Standard deviation income/expenditures
per capita ($PPP) 1221 1899
Coefficient of variation (%) 43 52 +926
Table 14. Eastern Europe and FSU: Gini decomposition, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993 Change
Within countries 3.9 9.5 +5.6
Between countries 12.5 26.4 +13.9
Overlapping 9.1 10.4 +1.3
Total Gini 25.6 46.4 +20.8
Number of countries 22 22
Mean country Gini 21.7 32.6 +10.2
Coefficient of variation of Gini 14.6 23.9 +7.2
Average income/expenditures  per capita ($PPP) 3681 2795 -24.0
Standard deviation income/expenditures
per capita ($PPP) 2000 1472
Coefficient of variation (%) 54 53 -1
Table 15. Western Europe, North America, Oceania: Gini decomposition, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993 Change
Within countries 8.5 8.3 -0.2
Between countries 14.4 8.9 -5.5
Overlapping 14.1 19.4 +5.3
Total Gini 37.1 36.6 -0.5
Number of countries 22 22
Mean country Gini 30.4 31.8 +1.4
Coefficient of variation of Gini 15.9 22.0 +6.1
Average income/expenditures per capita ($PPP) 7817 10684 +36.7
Standard deviation income/expenditures
per capita ($PPP) 3751 5284
Coefficient of variation (%) 48 49 +1
Note: Ginis in Tables 11-15 calculated for individuals within each region ranked according to their
household per capita $PPP income or expenditures. Common-sample countries. Regional mean Ginis and their
standard deviations are unweighted (it is the simple average Gini, and standard deviation of the Gini for all the
countries of the region). Regional mean incomes and their standard deviations are population-weighted. Change in
average income per capita is in current $PPP.27
V. World income inequality
Figure 3 shows the density function of world income distribution in 1988 and 1993. It
illustrates the rising number of people with extremely low incomes: note that the 1993 curve lies
above the 1988 curve for incomes up to $PPP200  per year.  The two modes of the  distribution
are around $PPP400 and a little over $PPP1,100. The mean world income in 1993 was
$PPP3,160, some 29 percent higher than in 1988 (when it was $PPP2,450). These are amounts in
current international dollars. In order to be comparable we need to deflate the 1993 value by 22
percent  which is equal to the increase in the US price level (PPP numeraire). We thus find that
between 1988 and 1993, mean per capita world income increased by 5.7 percent in real terms (or
by 1.1 percent p.a. on average). The median income in 1993 was $PPP1,041, some 18 percent
higher than in 1988, or 3 percent less in real terms. 
16 The fact that the mean real income would
increase while the median would go down suggests that inequality (skewness) of the distribution
increased.
                                                       
16 The median world per capita income in 1988 was $PPP 885.28
Figure 3. World income distribution in 1988 and 1993 (in million of persons)
 Note: x-axis in logs. Distribution functions are smoothed using kernel function with the bandwidth of  0.005.
How great is world inequality? In 1993, the Gini coefficient for world per capita $PPP
income/expenditure distribution was 66.0. The value is almost the same whether we use the
common-sample countries or the full sample. Compared to 1988, inequality has increased by 3.2
Gini points (for the common-sample countries) or 3.4 Gini points (for the full sample).
17 The
implied increase of about 0.7 Gini points per year is very high. During the 1980’s, inequality in
the US and the UK increased by about ½ a Gini point per year (Atkinson, Rainwater, and
Smeeding, 1995, p.25). Similarly, Li, Squire and Zou (1998, p.32) in the panel analysis of 49
countries find that only two countries (China and Chile) had increases averaging more than ½
Gini point per year. Using the Theil index, world inequality is estimated at about 87, an increase
of about 11 Theil points compared to 1988. The increase is more important if measured by the
Theil index (13 percent) than if measured by the Gini index (6 percent). What is remarkable
about the increase is that  (i) it occurs at an already very high level of inequality, and (ii) is
                                                       
17 The standard errors for the calculated Gini were 3.1 Gini points in 1988, and 2.7 Gini points in 1993.  This means
that the one-standard error range within which the “true” Gini might have lied in 1988 was 59.7—65.9, and in 1993
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present in all measures reported here—that is, whether we use common-country sample or the
full sample, PPP dollars or current dollars, Gini or Theil index (Table 16).  Of course, the current
dollar inequality is even higher. It reaches a Gini of 80 in 1993.
Table 16. World international dollar inequality in 1988 and 1993
(distribution of persons by $PPP and $ income per capita)
Full sample Common sample
International
dollars



















Note: Gini standard errors given between brackets.
Lorenz dominance. A comparison between the Lorenz curves for 1988 and 1993 shows
that income distribution for 1988 is Lorenz-dominant (Figure 4). For any cumulative percent of
world population, the 1988 curve lies above the 1993 curve. This is illustrated also by the data in
Table 17. Note that the share of the bottom quintile of the population has decreased from 2.3
percent of total world $PPP income to 2.0 percent;  that of the bottom half from 9.6 percent to
8.5 percent etc. Thus, not only is the Gini higher in 1993, but any quasi-convex social welfare
function would rank the 1988 distribution above the 1993 distribution—provided, of course,
mean incomes are the same. This condition, however, is not satisfied because the 1993 real
income was higher than the 1988 real income. We thus move to the investigation of stochastic
dominance.30
Figure 4.  World Lorenz curves for 1988 and 1993
Table 17. Cumulative percentage of persons and income/expenditures




Bottom 10 percent 0.9 0.8
Bottom 20 percent 2.3 2.0
Bottom 50 percent 9.6 8.5
Bottom 75 percent 25.9 22.3
Bottom 85 percent 41.0 37.1
Top 10 percent 46.9 50.8
Top 5 percent 31.2 33.7
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Stochastic dominance. Lorenz dominance simply shows that inequality in 1993 was
unambiguously greater than in 1988. But, as we have seen, world real per capita income
increased between 1993 and 1988 by 5.7 percent. It is therefore possible that at each percentile of
income distribution real income in 1993 was higher than in 1988 (first order stochastic
dominance). Table 18 shows the test of first order stochastic dominance. It is rejected. We see
that income of the bottom 75 percent of people was less in real terms in 1993 than in 1988. The
largest difference was for the bottom five percent and the 70-75
th percentile who have lost 14-16
percent in real terms. Between the 10
th and the 30
th percentile, the loss amounts to about 10
percent; it then becomes smaller and nil for the 50
th percentile before rising again around the 70
th
percentile. 
18 The 1993 distribution dominates the 1988 distribution for the top quintile only. The
people in the top quintile have gained between 3 and 18 percent in real terms. Thus, in a nutshell,
a description of inequality changes that have occurred in the world between 1988 and 1993 is:
the poorest five percent have lost almost 1/4 of their real income,
19 the top quintile has gained 12
percent.
                                                       
18 This last loss is largely caused by income declines in Eastern Europe and the FSU: a large chunk of East European
population had incomes around the 70
th  world percentile in 1988, they slipped downards, and those who replaced
them have lower incomes.
19 The data in Table 18 are calculated at the exact percentage points. Thus, the real income of a person at the 5
th
percentile went down by 14 percent between 1988 and 1993. But the total real income of the bottom 5 percent of
people is 23 percent less in 1988 than in 1993. Ditto for the top quintile.32
Table 18. First order stochastic dominance: real per capita income by percentile










5 277.4 238.1 86
10 348.3 318.1 91
15 417.5 372.9 89
20 486.1 432.1 89
25 558.3 495.8 89
30 633.2 586.0 93
35 714.5 657.7 92
40 802.7 741.9 92
45 908.3 883.2 97
50 1047.5 1044.1 100
55 1314.4 1164.9 89
60 1522.7 1505.0 99
65 1898.9 1856.8 98
70 2698.5 2326.8 86
75 3597.0 3005.6 84
80 4370.0 4508.1 103
85 5998.9 6563.3 109
90 8044.0 9109.8 113
95 11518.4 13240.7 115
99 20773.2 24447.1 118
Note: All values  expressed in 1993 international dollars. The values show income exactly at a given
percentile of income distribution.
Figure 5a displays a test of first order stochastic dominance for each region. As already
mentioned, a distribution A is first-order dominant over distribution B, if at any given percentile
of  income distribution, a person in distribution A has a higher income than a person in
distribution B. If we accept that these are the same people (which they obviously are not when
we compare two distributions in two different points in time), we can say that distribution A is
Pareto-superior to B.
20 Only WENAO displays the first order stochastic dominance: 1993
dominates 1988. In Eastern Europe and FSU, in contrast, the 1988 distribution would be first-
order dominant were it not for the slightly higher incomes at the very top of income distribution
in 1993. For other regions, and the world, the two distributions intersect. However, the situation
varies between the regions. In Africa, real income of the population up to the 55
th percentile was
                                                       
20 Note, however, that while A may be first-order dominant, distribution B can still be Lorenz-dominant. For
example, income distribution in (say) Mali can Lorenz-dominate that in the US, although absolute income level for
every percentile may be higher in the US than in Mali.33
higher in 1988 than in 1993. In LAC, the bottom decile has lost between 1988 and 1993, while
for the rest the two distributions criss-cross, although on balance incomes are higher in 1993.
Finally, in Asia, the two curves almost coincide up to the 60
th percentile, and those above are
better off in 1993 than in 1988. These results highlight the well-known decline in real incomes
practically across the board in Eastern Europe/FSU, but also the worsening position of the
bottom half of the population in Africa (an issue which should be of greatest concern), and of the
bottom decile in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In Figure 5b we look at the second-order stochastic dominance.
21 In this case, the
requirement for distribution A to dominate distribution B is that at each percentile of income
distribution mean cumulative income of those in A be greater than mean cumulative income of
those in distribution B. In other words, we require that (say) the bottom 20 percent of the




th) have a higher income as in the case of first-order dominance. Here only Eastern
Europe/FSU and Africa pass the test. In both cases, the 1988 distribution dominates the 1993
distribution. For the world, the bottom four quintiles received cumulatively less in real terms in
1993 than in 1988. Income gains were concentrated in the top quintile. For Asia, the 1988
distribution dominates the 1993 distribution up to the 60
th percentile, although the difference is
small; for LAC countries, the 1988 distribution is better only for the lowest decile.
                                                       
21 The first-order dominance implies the second-order dominance. The second-order stochastic dominance means the
same thing as generalized Lorenz curve dominance (as in Shorrocks, 1983).34
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Note: First-order stochastic
dominance implies that, at each
percentile, income of distribution A
is greater than income of distribution
B. Second-order stochastic
dominance implies that, at each
percentile, cumulative income of
distribution A is greater than
cumulative income of distribution B.36
              VI. How to explain the level,  and change in world inequality?
Decomposition of  total inequality. Using the same decomposition formula as before, the
between-country component for the world turns out to be 57.8 Gini points in 1993, and 55.1 Gini
points in 1988 (Table 19). This means that 88 percent of world inequality is due to differences in
countries’ mean incomes. The within-country inequality accounts for only 1.3 Gini points or 2
percent of total world inequality. The remainder (10 percent of world inequality) is due to the
“overlap” component.
According to the Theil index which is exactly decomposable, between-country
differences explain ¾ of world inequality, and within-country inequality the remaining ¼ in both
1988 and 1993. According to both Theil and Gini indices, the individual components of
inequality increased in step—keeping the composition of inequality the same in both years.
Table 19. World income inequality in 1988 and 1993
(common-sample countries; distribution of persons by $PPP income/expenditure per capita)






















Total world inequality 62.8 66.0 76.5 87.3
Number of countries 91 91 91 91
Mean country Gini /Theil 33.7 36.9 23.7 26.7
Standard deviation of Gini/Theil 11.2 9.9 19.6 17.1
Average income/expenditures per
capita ($PPP) 2450 3160
Standard deviation of per capita
income/expenditures 2552 3591
Coefficient of variation 1.04 1.14
Notes: Percentage contribution to total inequality between brackets.
Common-sample countries. Mean country  Gini and Theil and their standard deviations are unweighted.
Average world income and its standard deviation are population-weighted.37
The decomposition results raise three questions that we shall address in turn. They are: (i)
what lies behind the very high between-country component of inequality; (ii) why is the “pure”
within-country inequality component in the Gini coefficient so small, and (iii) what drove the
increase of  2.7 Gini points in the between-country component which was the main factor behind
the increase in the overall world inequality? The first two questions are “static”: they refer to the
decomposition of the 1993 measures of inequality. The third  question is  “dynamic”: it asks
why inequality increased between 1988 and 1993.
In the rest of the analysis, I shall consider only inequality adjusted for purchasing power
($PPP) and, in order to avoid spurious changes due to the difference in the composition of the
sample, I shall consider only common-sample countries.
What are the main contributors to the between-country inequality? As we know from
































For each pair of countries (i,j), its value depends on (i) the difference in mean incomes
between these two countries, and (ii) the two countries’ shares in total population. The view of
the world implicit in Pyatt’s decomposition is one  populated by representative individuals
having mean income of their countries. The greater the number of countries, the greater—under
ceteris paribus conditions—the between-country component of total inequality.
22 The largest
inter-country terms (ICT) will be those interacting poor and rich populous countries. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the single largest contributors to total inequality belong, on the one hand,
to China-rural and China-urban, and India-rural and India-urban, and, on the other, to the United
States, Japan, Germany, France and the UK. India and China (both rural and urban) account for
                                                       
22 The approximation to the Lorenz curve implied in Pyatt’s decomposition is that of a number of straight lines (one
for each country) whose length is proportional to country’s population share. The greater the number of such lines,
the closer the resulting polygon comes to the true Lorenz curve based on individual incomes. A different view of the
world and a different Gini decomposition formula is proposed by Yitzhaki (1994).  The latter is not a standard
decomposition formula though, and a comparison between it and Pyatt’s decomposition is addressed in Yitzhaki and
Milanovic (forthcoming).38
45.2  percent of world population in 1993, 
23 and the five rich countries for 12.6 percent. The
difference in mean incomes between these nine countries accounts for 18.9 Gini points or almost
30 percent of total world inequality (see Table 20). 
24








USA 3.8 3.0 1.3 1.0 9.1 5.6
Japan 1.7 1.4 0.6 0.5 4.2 2.7
Germany 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.4 1.8
France 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.7 1.2
UK 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.5 1.3
Total 7.8 6.2 2.7 2.2 18.9 12.6
Population share (%) 18.5 14.3 7.3 5.1 57.8
The greatest contributors to the world Gini are therefore large countries that are at the
two poles of the income distribution spectrum, the so-called “twin peaks” (Quah, 1997). One
pole is represented by more than 2.4 billion people who live in countries whose mean income is
less than $PPP1,000 per year (Figure 6).
25 They include both rural and urban India, rural and
urban Indonesia, and rural China. The next pole obtains for the income level of over $PPP
11,500. There are more than ½ billion people who live in such rich countries. They include US,
Japan, Germany, France and the UK. The poor pole accounts for 42 percent of  world (more
exactly, common-sample) population and about 9 percent of world PPP income; the rich pole
accounts for 13 percent of world population and 45 percent of world PPP income. Populous
countries that have “middling” per capita incomes (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Russia) do contribute to
inequality but much less so than the two polar sets. Fast economic growth of China and India
would therefore have a huge impact on reducing world inequality since the difference between
their mean incomes and those of OECD countries would go down. In 1993, the difference in
                                                       
23 More exactly, of  the common-sample population.
24 The difference in mean incomes between China (rural and urban), India (rural and urban), and the US alone
explains 9.1 Gini points, or more than 15 percent of  world inequality.
25 Note that the difference between Figures 3 and 6 illustrates the difference between world and international income
distribution.39
mean per capita income between the US and rural China was $PPP 11,506, or 3.6 times greater
than the average world $PPP income. Suppose that due to faster growth in rural China the
difference is reduced to 3 times world average. With unchanged world population shares of rural
China and the US, the ICT will be 3.2 Gini points instead of 3.6 Gini points now. The overall
world inequality would be reduced by much more—by almost 4 Gini points due to the
decreasing difference between the mean income in rural China and mean income in other richer
countries.
Figure 6. Distribution of population (in million) according to
average per capita country income where they live (in ‘000$PPP per year)
However, every synthetic index of inequality, and the Gini is no exception to that, is a
very complex statistic. We have just seen that faster per capita growth of China reduces the ITCs
between China, and the rich populous OECD countries. It is also absolutely crucial for the
reduction of world inequality. As Table 21 shows, if China’s and India’s income were to increase














































world inequality would be reduced by between 0.8 and 6.2 Gini points.
26 All of the decrease
occurs through a lower between-country component, while the “overlap” component—as we
would expect since more rich Chinese/Indians would have greater incomes than poor citizens of
richer countries—goes up. However,  if we suppose that China and India continue to grow faster
than other populous countries, there may be a point where the gain in world equality achieved
through them getting closer to the rich OECD countries may be offset by the growing difference
between China and India, on the one hand, and Indonesia, Nigeria, and Bangladesh on the other,
which we assume –for the sake of the argument—not to grow at all. This point occurs only for an
extremely high increase in China’s and India’s per capita income: more than 7 times the current
level so that urban China’s income would be equal to that of Hong Kong, and rural India’s
income would equal that of Bulgaria. However, this illustrates the fact that the Gini coefficient is
U-shaped even in income growth of the two largest, and among the poorest, countries. A
situation might then ensue where instead of a bi-polar world, depicted in Figure 6, we might have
a tri-polar world, with one or several large countries with incomes around the median. Yet this
might imply the same or even higher Gini inequality.
Table 21. World Gini and its components as China’s and India’s
per capita incomes increase (simulations)
Percent income increase
0 10 20 50 70 85 100
Gini points
Within countries 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
Between countries 57.8 56.9 56.0 53.6 52.2 51.2 50.3
Overlapping 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.4 7.5 7.8 7.9
Total Gini 66.0 65.2 64.4 62.5 61.2 60.6 59.8
Why is the within-country inequality so small?  There are two reasons for this. First, it is
because the countries with large total incomes (most OECD countries) have relatively small
populations, and the reverse for countries like China and India. (Recall that the within component
of the Gini coefficient is equal to SGipipi.) The largest population in the common sample is that
of rural China with 18.5 percent of world population but with only 5 percent of world $PPP
income. Largest income weight is that of the US with 29 percent of world income but with only
5.6 percent of world population. Since the weight attached to the individual country Gini in the
                                                       
26 Populations are assumed unchanged throughout.41
Pyatt decomposition is the product of  country’s income and population shares, this means that
the largest weight is 0.0145 (i.e. 0.29 times 0.05). For most countries, the weights attached to
their Ginis are thus very small and the sum of weights is far smaller than 1 (in 1993, the sum was
0.038). Obviously, if a very large country, like China and India, were also a very rich country its
weight in both population and total income would be great, and it would strongly influence the
within component. However, in reality, even if the Ginis of a number of countries were to
significantly increase, the within-country component would not go up by much. For example, if
both China's--rural and urban--Ginis increased to 50 (from the current values of respectively 33
and 27), and the US Gini increased to 60 (from the current value of 37), the within-country
component would increase by only ½ Gini point.
Figure 7. Distribution of countries by mean annual $PPP income
calculated from Household Surveys (1993)
This is but a mechanical explanation for the low within-country inequality component. A
substantive explanation is as follows. Mean country incomes are very close to each other
particularly among poor countries (see Figure 7). 62 countries have mean HS incomes that are
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 If mean incomes are very close, then the only way for the overlap component to be
small, and for the within-country component to be relatively large, is if countries’ own income
density functions are very narrow with Ginis close to 0 (see Figure 8b).
27 But since individual
country Ginis are, of course, not zero, poor people from a slightly richer country will overlap
with the rich people from a slightly poorer country (see Figure 8a). To see this, superimpose
density functions from Figure 8a onto the mean incomes (dots) in Figure 7. There would be a lot
of overlapping particularly among the poorer countries, whose incomes are not only  more
“crowded” but where inequality is also greater so that the density functions have longer tails.
28
Thus any inequality above 0 will “feed” the overlap component. Or, in other words, the overlap
component will be small only  if (i) mean incomes are very far (different) from each other, or (ii)
individual country distributions are very equal.
29 Neither is the case here.
Figure 8a. Large overlap component in Gini decomposition
Figure 8b. Small overlap component in Gini decomposition
Note: vertical lines represent countries mean incomes.
                                                       
27 Imagine the situation where all mean country income differ by only ?x. Then, the overlap component will be 0
only if individual country Ginis are 0.
28 The simple correlation coefficient between Gini and level of per capita income (in $PPP) is –0.31 in 1988, and
–0.25 in 1993.






Another question raised by the finding that most of world inequality is due to the
differences between countries mean incomes is, how sensitive world Gini is at distributional
changes within countries (which leave mean incomes unchanged).  The answer is that it is
sensitive although most of the change may occur through the overlap component. For example, if
we let US, UK and German distributions experience regressive transfers such that each of the
bottom nine deciles loses 10 percent of its income in favor of the top decile, world Gini in 1993
increases by 0.4 Gini points, 0.3 of which is due to the greater overlap.
30 What happens is that
the poor, middle-class etc. end of distribution of these rich countries now shifts to the left (see
Figures 8a), and more of those people overlap with people from poorer countries.
Finally note that a  relatively small importance of within-country inequality and the
overlap component in Pyatt-type Gini decomposition does not mean that one can ignore them
and, in the absence of large distributional changes within the countries, use the between
component as a fully satisfactory proxy for world inequality (as is sometimes argued; see
Melchior, Telle and Wiig, 2000, p.18). This is not the case though: when incomes of poor
countries like India and China grow relative to those of the rich countries, it does not only reduce
the distance between the countries’ mean incomes and lowers the value of (2), but also affects—
even in the absence of distributional change—the two other Gini components. First, greater
weight of China’s and India’s GDP in the world might increase the within-country component
depending on whether India’s and China’s Ginis are greater than the mean Gini in the world.
Second, and more importantly, there is an increase in the overlap term as more people from these
poor countries “mingle” with people from rich countries. This is reflected in the rising overlap
component in our simulations in Table 21:  while the between term went down by 7½ Gini
points, the overlap term increased by 1 Gini point. Using the changes in the between component
alone will give a biased (and a more optimistic) view of changes in world inequality.
What factors were behind the 2.7 Gini points increase in between-country inequality
between 1988 and 1993?  We have already seen that the most significant contributor to the
                                                       
30 The assumed distributional changes are significant: they increase Ginis of the three countries by between 5 and
5.5 Gini points.44
overall Gini is the between-country component, and within it, the income differences between
the poor populous countries of Asia (India and China), and the rich, but less populous, five
OECD countries (US, Japan, France, Germany and the UK). But while these ICTs are large they
may not be the ones that have increased the most between 1988 and 1993, and may not therefore
be the ones driving the increase in inequality between the two years. Indeed, as seen in Table 22,
some of them have decreased in importance, that is they have contributed to reducing inequality.
Shrinking difference between, on the one hand, China’s mean rural and urban income and, on the
other, the mean US income has shaved off almost ½ Gini points from world inequality.
Similarly, decreasing income differences between (i)  China and rural India, and  (ii) three large
countries (Brazil, Russia and Ukraine) whose per capita real incomes have gone down, have
reduced world Gini by 1.3 points (Table 22).
 31
But in addition the ICT between rural China and the US decreased also on account of
shrinking percentage of world population living in rural China. In 1988, 19.5 percent of world
population lived in rural China; in 1993, that percentage was 18.5. Thus, both the fact that
China’s income rose compared to the US, and that its population moved out of the poorer rural
areas, contributed to reduce world inequality.
Table 22. Largest negative (inequality-reducing) changes
 in inter-country terms between 1988 and 1993 (in Gini points)
China(rural) China(urban) India(rural) Japan
USA -0.40 -0.05 -0.14
Russia -0.30 -0.12 -0.17
Ukraine -0.21 -0.14
Brazil -0.19 -0.09 -0.09
This calculation allows us to illustrate the following problem. Consider growth of rural
incomes in India vs. US. Rural incomes in India increased by only 5 percent, the mean income in
the US increased by 24 percent. Since US started as a richer country, this should, at first glance,
                                                       
31 However, income declines in Eastern Europe/FSU did not have an overall equalizing effect on world income
inequality. If we conduct a simulation exercise for 1993 keeping real incomes and inequality in the Eastern
Europe/FSU at their 1988 level, world income Gini becomes 64.7 instead of the actual 66.0. Thus, changes outside
the transition countries are responsible for an increase of almost 2 Gini points in  world inequality (64.7 minus 62.8),
while the changes in transition economies added another 1.3 Gini points (66.0 minus 64.7).45
imply that the inter-country Gini component should increase, and not decrease. However, note
that the formula for each ICT is
so that –given unchanged pi and pj—it will go up only if the difference between the
incomes increases faster than the mean world income.  [One might remember that Gini is a
mean-standardized measure of inequality.] In the case of rural India-US, the difference between
these two countries’ mean incomes increased from $PPP 9,495 to $11,870. However, this
increase (25 percent) was less than the increase in the mean world income (29 percent). Thus the
difference between mean income in rural India and income in  the US decreased from being 3.87
times world mean income to being 3.75 times world mean income. This example illustrates that
for a single ICT to go up, and thus to add to world inequality, it is not sufficient that a rich
country grow faster than a poor country. The absolute difference between the two countries’
incomes must increase faster than world mean income.
32
What were then the main factors underlying the increase in inequality between 1988 and
1993? They were two. First, slower growth of rural areas in large South Asian countries (India
and Bangladesh) and in rural China compared to several OECD countries (France, Japan,
Germany)
33 is responsible for 2 Gini points increase of world inequality (see Table 23). Mean
per capita rural income in India increased by 5 percent in current $PPP between 1988 and 1993;
                                                                                                                                                                                  
32 This can be shown by the total differentiation of the ICT term (denoted by ?):















where ri=growth rate of country i and pipj assumed constant. After some further rearrangements, the condition for
d?>0 becomes:
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The latter expression is greater than ri whenever rµ>ri. This means that whenever world mean income grows faster
than the income of the poorer country, for the ICP to increase it is not sufficient that the rich country simply grow
faster than the poor.







in Bangladesh the increase was 14 percent, and in rural China 21 percent.
 Meanwhile, mean
current $PPP incomes in the US increased by 24 percent, in Japan by 60 percent, and in
Germany by 43 percent.
34  The absolute income differences between a few large OECD
countries and populous rural areas in Asia thus increased faster than did world income overall;
this in turn increased the ICTs, and added to world inequality.
Second, the widening differences within China between urban and rural areas, and
between urban China and rural India, pushed world inequality up by about 0.45 Gini points.
35
Table 23. Largest positive (inequality-increasing) changes
in inter-country terms between 1988 and 1993 (in Gini points)
Bangladesh India(rural) China(rural)
Japan 0.20 0.28 0.23
Germany 0.12 0.25 0.25
France 0.14 0.14
USA 0.42
   Subtotal 0.74 0.67 0.61
China(urban) 0.22 0.23
Total 0.74 1.11 1.08
In conclusion, what happens to world inequality is to a large extent determined by what
happens to inequality between the countries, and what happens to the inequality between the
countries depends, to a large extent, on what is the relationship between mean incomes in China,
India, and several large OECD countries. This explains the ambiguous effects produced by the
relatively fast growth of mean income in urban China. On the one hand, Chinese urban growth
reduced its distance from the middle-income and rich countries and thus the world Gini; on the
other hand, though, the widening gap between urban and rural China, and between urban China
and rural India,  it increased world inequality.
                                                       
34 This translates into 2 percent per capita real growth in the US, 17 percent in Germany and about 30 percent in
Japan (all over the 1988-93 period). Compare this with real GDP growth over the same period of 9 percent in the
US, 15 percent in Germany, and 16 percent in Japan.
35 While current $PPP incomes in rural China increased by 21 percent, the growth in urban areas was over 70
percent.47
VII. Comparison with other studies
 Table 24 shows the estimates of world inequality collected from several other studies
mentioned in Section II. In terms of methodology, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999) and
Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1982) are the closest to our study because they use income
shares derived from household surveys. However, in both cases, income shares for a number of
countries are approximated using income shares of “similar” countries—whether it is done by
using econometric techniques (as in the 1982 paper), or by simply “assigning” what are deemed
to be similar countries. Yet the results for the world inequality are very similar to the ones
obtained here. The world Gini coefficient for 1992 is estimated by Bourguignon and Morrisson
as 66.3; we find that, in 1993, it is equal to 66.0. Everything else being the same, we would
expect to find a lower Gini value than Bourguignon and Morrisson because they use GDPs per
capita and we use actual mean incomes from surveys. As mentioned above, the differences
between the rich and  poor countries are less when we use HS incomes or expenditures than
when we use GDP per capita. On the other hand, the fact that for all countries we use actual
survey data with at least 10 data points (while they mostly use quintiles) means that our
estimation of within-country inequality  and the overlap term is more precise and the two terms
thus greater. The two effects apparently offset each other. In effect, all four studies of world
inequality by other authors as well and ours, show world Gini to lie within a narrow range of 63
to 66. Studies of inter-national inequality, on the other hand, show that the between-country Gini
ranges between 53 and 55. Therefore using the standard Gini decomposition, about (or more
than) 4/5 of world inequality is due to differences in mean PPP incomes between the countries.48
Table 24. World and inter-national inequality as estimated by different authors
Gini Theil Note
World inequality
Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson
(1982)
64.9 (1970) Uses GDP per capita and income
shares; approximates distributions for
a number of countries
Grosh and Nafziger (1986) 63.6 (1970’s) Uses GDP per capita and income
shares; approximates distributions for
some 40 countries
Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao
(1997)
64.8 (1990) Uses GDP per capita data;
approximates distributions.
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999) 66.3 (1992) 86.4 (1992) Uses GDP per capita and income
shares; approximates distributions for
a number of countries




Uses actual HS data
Inter-national inequality
Theil and Seale (1994) 64.5 (1986) Only between-country component;
uses GDP per capita
Podder (1993) 53.1 (1987) Only between-country inequality; uses
GDP per capita
T. Paul Schultz (1998) 55.2 (1989) Only between-country component;
uses GDP per capita
Firebaugh (1999) 54.3 (1989) 52.6 (1989) Only between-country inequality; uses
GDP per capita




Uses actual HS data
Note: Year of estimation between brackets. All GDP per capita are in $PPP terms.49
VIII. Conclusions
Our main conclusions from the first calculation of world income and expenditure
inequality based solely on household surveys –which covers about 84 percent of world
population and 93 percent of world GDP—can be summarized in several points:
1. World income inequality is very high: the Gini coefficient is 66 if one uses incomes
adjusted for differences in countries’ purchasing power, and almost 80 if one uses current dollar
incomes.
2. World inequality has increased (using the same sample of countries) from a Gini of
62.8 in 1988 to 66.0 in 1993. This represents an increase of 0.6 Gini points per year. This is a
very fast increase, faster than the increase experienced by the US and UK in the decade of the
1980’s. (The Gini coefficient is scale-invariant: thus larger and smaller units can legitimately be
compared.)
3. Differences between countries’ mean incomes is the most important factor behind
world inequality. It explains between 75 to 88 percent of overall inequality (depending on
whether we use Gini or Theil coefficient to measure inequality).
4. The increase of inequality between 1988 and 1993 occurred as both between-country
and within-country inequality increased. However, since their relative proportions remained the
same,  it was the between-country inequality which, being much larger,  drove overall inequality
up. More specifically, slow growth of  rural per capita incomes in populous Asian countries
(China, India and Bangladesh) compared to income growth of several large and rich OECD
countries, plus fast growth of urban China compared to rural China and rural India, were the
main reasons why world Gini increased.
5. World income distribution in 1988 Lorenz-dominates the distribution in 1993. Neither
year is stochastically dominant (either first- or second-order). However, if one considers different
regions, in the Western Europe, North America and Oceania (WENAO) region, 1993
stochastically dominates 1988. Other regions display no such regularity. In Africa, and Eastern
Europe/FSU,  though, 1988 displays a second-order stochastic dominance over 1993.50
6. What happens to world inequality depends to a large extent on what happens to the
relative position of China and India (on the one end of the spectrum), and US, Japan, France and
Germany, on the other end.
7. The bottom 5 percent of the world grew poorer, as their real incomes decreased
between 1988 and 1993 by  ¼, while the richest quintile grew richer. It gained 12 percent in real
terms, that is its income grew more than twice as much as mean world income (5.7 percent).
8. A number of other statistics can be generated from world income distribution. These
are some examples:
• The richest 1 percent of people in the world receive as much as the bottom 57 percent,
or in other words, less than 50 million richest people receive as much as 2.7 billion poor.
 • An American having the average income of the bottom US decile is better-off  than 2/3
of world population.
• The top 10 percent of the US population has an aggregate income equal to income of
the poorest 43 percent of people in the world, or differently put, total income of the richest 25
million Americans is equal to total income of almost 2 billion people.
• The ratio between average income of the world top 5 percent and world bottom 5
percent increased  from 78 to 1 in 1988, to 114 to 1 in 1993.
• 75 percent of world population receive 25 of world $PPP income; and the reverse.
• 84 percent of world population receive 16 percent of world (unadjusted) dollar income;
and the reverse.51
Annex 1. Data sources
All data come from nationally-representative household surveys. Most of the data for
Western Europe, Northern America and Oceania come from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
For some European countries not fully included in LIS (Greece, Portugal, France), the data were
provided by individual researchers, or by countries’ statistical offices (Ireland, Switzerland).
Most of the data for Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union are taken from Milanovic
(1998) and different World Bank sources (e.g. poverty assessments for Georgia, Armenia).
For Latin American countries, most of the 1988 data are from Psacharopoulos, Morley,
Fiszbein, Lee and Wood (1997). The 1993 data come from various World Bank sponsored
surveys, in particular Living Standard Measurement Surveys, LSMS’s (e.g. Ecuador, Jamaica,
Guyana, Nicaragua etc.) and countries’ own surveys available in the Bank (kindly provided by
Kihoone Lee and Julie Van Domelen). Some of the surveys were obtained from an extensive
data base created and maintained by Inter-American Development Bank (Dominican Republic,
Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela). They were kindly provided by Miguel
Szekely, Mariane Hilgert, and Ricardo Fuentes. Finally, several surveys were obtained directly
from countries’ statistical offices (Brazil, Honduras).
For Africa, most of the data come from World Bank financed surveys which have been
assembled and standardized in the Africa ISP-Poverty monitoring group. They have been kindly
supplied by Olivier Dupriez and Hyppolite Fofack. In addition, some of the surveys were
provided by the countries’ statistical offices directly (South Africa, Mauritius).
For most Asian countries, the data were kindly supplied by Shaohua Chen and Benu
Bidani. Some of these data were used in the book on East Asia by Ahuja, Bidani, Ferreira and
Walton (1997), and in Ravallion and Chen (1997) work on world poverty. Again, LSMS data
and Diane Steele’s help were invaluable. Data for some countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, South
Korea) were supplied  by the countries’ statistical offices. For some of the countries (Nepal),
household surveys were obtained from a very good and expanding World Bank’s Poverty
Monitoring Database maintained by Giovanna Prennuschi. The Database either provides the
surveys themselves or identifies the institutions or people who might be contacted.
Many other people in the World Bank (Luisa Ferreira, Paul Glewwe, Jacqueline Baptist,
Richard Adams, Bahjat Achikbakche, Peter Lanjouw, Ruslan Yemtsov, Francisco Ferreira,
Kihoone Lee, Boniface Essama Nssah, Roy Canagaraja, Jeanine Braithwaite) and outside (Peter
Krause for the East German data; Carlos Farinha Rodriguez for the Portuguese data; Carol Ernst
for the Swiss data; Panos Tsakloglou for the Greek data; Yap Yee Liong for the Singapore data)
also helped with the information. Yonas Biru and Yuri Dikhonov helped me generously with the
International Comparison (ICP) data. I am extremely grateful to all of them: clearly the project
would have been impossible without their help. Costas Krouskas and (in the very early stages of
the project, Nadia Soboleva) have done a splendid job in interlinking the country and regional
files and providing research assistance.52
About ¾ of the country data used in the study are calculated from individual (unit record)
data. Most of them come from four sources: HEIDE data base for East European and FSU
countries, LSMS Surveys, Africa ISP-Poverty monitoring group, and Luxembourg Income
study.
36  This, of course, means that variables and recipient units could be defined to precisely
reflect what I needed.
                                                       
36 The web site are: for HEIDE data base http://www.worldbank.org/research/transition/index.htm;for LSMS
surveys  http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/lsmshome.html; for Luxembourg Income Study,
http://lissy.ceps.lu/index.htm.53
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